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SITUATION II 
NAVAL PROTECTION DURING STRAINED 
RELATIONS 
The relations of states X andY, non-American 
states, are strained. Neither state has declared 
war though the military and naval forces have 
within a month exchanged shots. A law identical 
with the Joint Resolution of the United States ap-
proved May 1, 1937, providing for restrictions on 
export of arms, etc., is similarly operative in 
.American states C, D, E, and F. Only states C 
and D under their laws proclaim a state of war to 
exist between X and Y. 
(a) State X seizes articles on board a merchant 
vessel of state D which were placed under an em-
bargo by state C but· not in the embargo list of 
any other state. 
(b) A vessel of war of state Y is just off, but 
more than three miles, from state D and inspects 
the cargo of a merchant vessel flying the flag of 
D and finds articles embargoed by state D. 
(c) State E has a defensive alliance with states 
X and F. State E maintains that the embargo la\v 
does not apply until proclaimed by E and F. 
(d) A merchant vessel of state M is passing 
through the territorial waters of state C having 
on board articles enumerated under the prohibited 
list of C. A vessel of war of C brings the vessel 
to port, and the owners demand immediate release 
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on the ground of illegal seizure 'vhile on innocent 
passage in the tin1e of peace with goods not liable 
to seizure. 
How far are the acts of the several states and 
their contentions la\vful ~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) As there is no war and as the law mentioned 
relating to the export of arms, etc., is national in 
its effect, the action of· state X has no validity 
under that law even though states C and D have 
proclaimed that a state of war exists. 
(b) A vessel of \var of state Y has the right t9 
approach a merchant vessel suspected of piracy or 
other offense against the law of natio11s for purpose 
of identification, but the vessel of war of state X 
has no right to inspect or to· take any action· in 
regard to the articles in the cargo of a merchant 
vessel of state D and embargoed under domestic 
law. 
(c) The alliance between states E, F, and X 
\vould bind state E for defense and not before 
state X or F is at war with a third state. 
(d) The embargo legislation· is purely domestic 
and a vessel of war of state C may not lawfully 
interfere \vith a merchant vessel of state M when 
on innocent passage through the territorial waters 
of state C. 
NOTES 
Strained relations.-Strained relations between 
tribes in early days and between groups of less 
developed peoples in some parts of the world have 
led to contests of different types. Some of these 
show parallels to contests between states in later 
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days. Sometimes the differences were settled by 
a competition in the exchange of epithets or vitu-
peration. Wars of words or of notes have been 
known in modern times. 
Efforts to bring about perpetual peace among 
states have been made from time to time for many 
years. Some of the plans devised for that purpose 
have received wide nominal support, but 'vhen 
brought to a crucial test have thus far been ineffec-
tive. Even theW orld War, 1914-18, having as one 
of its objectives, "war to end war," has not put an 
end to conflicts between states even though these 
may not. reach th~ proportions of or may not be de-
clared to be war. If a stager in international de-
velopment should be reached when wars would be 
no more it can scarcely be hoped that there will be 
no friction between states wJ;len ther~ are so .many 
racial, economic, political, and other differences. 
In considering the very existence of states, there 
is an implication of differences which have led to 
their formation. Referring to these matters at the 
Naval War College in 1933 it was said: 
"Strained relations is a ter1n which has been used to indi-
cate an attitude of opposi~ion of states to one another in 
any degree short of war. Such relations often lead to war 
but are not war and the existence of these relations does not 
bring into operation the law of war." (1933 Naval War 
College, International Law Situations, p. 75.) 
Use of force.-Even though the custom of formal 
declaration of war declined dllring the seventeenth, 
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the use of 
force by one state against another was common. 
With the further development of professional 
armies and navies, the need of clearer rules in re-
gard to war became evident. Such rules for the 
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co11duct of \Var were gradually elaborated for \Var 
on land as in the Lieber Code during the Civil War 
in the United States \vhich became the basis of 
other codes. 
The conduct of \Var on the sea as affecting states 
not parties to the war \vas the subject of attention 
by the Britisl1 courts in the days of Lord Sto,vell 
and from the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
War had been defined as "that state in which a 
nation prosecutes its right by force.'' There had 
been no adequate definition of the degree of force 
essential to constitute war and there was, as there 
still is, a \vide difference of opinion as to what is a 
nation's "right," or what is a "just war.'' 
Battles had been fought against Mexican troops 
before the Congress of the United States passed the 
Act of May 13,1846, which recognized a state of war 
as existing with Mexico. 
Courts might have to decide in the nineteen 
century \vhether war existed on a given day and a 
state might by a proclamation announce that war 
commenced on some date prior to the declaration. 
This is evident in such cases as that of the United 
States of Arnerica v. Pelly and another in 1899. In 
this case, Mr. Justice Bingham said: 
"I will state 'vhy it is a fact that a state of war then 
existed. An act of hositility had been committed on April22 
by A1nerican men-of-war against Spanish traders, or, at all 
events, against one Spanish trader, which act, in my opinion, 
"\vas only consistent with the existence of a state of war. 
Further, on April22 the American President issued a procla-
mation in which he declared a general blockade of Cuba. A 
fe,v days later the Congress passed a resolution authorizing 
a formal state of war, but, in so doing, recorded, what was 
undoubtedly the fact, that a state of war had existed from 
some days previously." ( 4 Commercial Cases [1899] !00.) 
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There was also much uncertai11ty as to when the 
Russo-Japanese war began in 1904. It was de-
cided that 'vhen the J apa11ese fleet sailed from 
Sasebo, February 6, 1904, at 7 A. M., "with the 
object of opening hostilities," there was a state of 
war and captures were legal. From the late nine-
teenth century when fleets sailed under sealed or-
ders for maneuvers or practice, there might be 
serious misunderstandings since foreig11 powers 
were free to deter1nine the "object" of the move-
ment of the fleet. 
When states were not under obligation to declare 
"\Var, there was frequent resort to the use of force 
which 'vas announced to be reprisals, pacific block-
ade, or some other measure short of war. Either 
state might regard such an act as the commence-
ment of war. Such a condition left third states 
uncertain as to whether war really existed or as to 
"\Vhen it actually began. This introduced many 
complications though some states maintained that 
the advantage of a possible surprise attack should 
not be renom1ced. Others argued that under mod-
eril conditions there was little possibility of sur-
prise in the commencement of war. 
Distinction between, belligerent and protective 
actio1L-The situation arising in Russia in 1919 
became the subject of correspondence between the 
Commission to Negotiate Peace and the American 
Secretary of State. In replying to certain pro-
posals, the acting Secretary of State said, on July 
18, 1919, "A blockade before a state of vvar exists 
is out of the question'' (Foreign Relations, U. S., 
1919, "Russia, ' ' p. 153), and at this thne it was 
generally accepted that war without a declaratio11 
would be contrary to the law. The distinction be-
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t'veen belligerency and military operations was also 
discussed in the Commission, and a communication 
was, at tl1e request of M. Clemenceau, transmitted 
to the President of the United States on July 27, 
1919: 
"British, French, Italian, Japanese members of the Coun-
cil of Five, respectfully offer the following on the President's 
message relating to neutral trade in the Gulf of Finland. 
They do not desire to express any opinion upon the state-
ment of internationalla w laid down in the telegram. It may 
well be true that where there is no state of belligerency there 
can be no legal blockade; but they would point out that the 
situation in Russia and in the Gulf of Finland is at the 
present moment such as hardly to permit rigid application 
of rules which in ordinary cases are quite uneontested. Lan-
guage in which international law is expressed is fitted to 
describe the relations between the organized states on the one 
hand and unorganized chaos on the other hand. Russia 
during this period of transition is not a state but a collection 
of 'de facto' governments at war with each other and 
though it is quite true to say that the Allied and Associated 
Powers are not in a state of belligerency 'vith Russia it is 
also true they are involved in military operations with one 
of these 'de facto' governments and that they are supplying 
arms and ammunition to the others." (Ibid., p. 154.) 
To this the President replied on August 2, 1919: 
"The President js not unmindful of the serious situation 
which exists in relation to neutral trade in the Baltic with 
the Russian ports controlled by the Bolsheviks. He has 
given careful consideration to the arguments advanced in 
the message transmitted at the request of ~1. Clemenceau and 
is not unmindful of their force in support of the proposed 
interruption of commerce with the ports mentioned. How-
ever, "~hile he fully understands the reasons for employing 
war measures to prevent the importation of munitions and 
food supplies into the portion of Russia now in the hands 
of the Bolsheviks, he labors under the difficulty of being 
''ithout constitutional right to prosecute an act of war 
such as a blockade affecting neutrals unless there has been a 
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declaration o:f war by the Congress o:f the United States 
against the nation so blockaded. 
"The landing o:f troops at Archangel and Murmansk was 
done to protect the property and supplies o:f the American 
and Allied Governments until they could be removed. The 
sending o:f troops to Siberia was to keep open the railway 
for the protection o:f Americans engaged in its operation and 
to make sa:fe :from possible German and Austrian attack the 
retiring Czechoslovaks. The :furnishing o:f supplies to the 
Russians in Siberia, 'vhile indicating a sympathy with the 
efforts to restore order and sa:fety o:f li:fe and property, can-
not be construed as a belligerent act." (Ibid., p. 155.) 
Purpose of Act of ]fay 1, 1937.-In reply to a 
question of November 25, 1937, as to the use of the 
Act of May 1, 1937,1 as an instrument of policy, the 
Secretary of State said: 
"With regard to the eighth question, the entering into 
force o:f the restrictive provisions o:f the Neutrality Act of 
May 1, 1937, is le:ft to and is dependent upon decision o:f the 
President by a finding that 'there exists a state o:f war.' 
The policy o:f the Department o:f State in reference to this 
Act is dependent upon that decision. The Department of 
State keeps constantly in mind the :fact that the principal 
purpose o:f the Act is to keep the United States out o:f war." 
(International Conciliation, No. 336, p. 36; Department of 
State, Press Releases, XVII, No. 428, p. 416.) 
National and i1~ternational 'neutrality laws.-It 
is desirable to point out again that ''Domestic neu-
trality laws do not necessarily have any effect upon 
the internationallavv of neutrality either in limit-
ing or extending its scope.'' (1936 Naval War Col-
lege, International La'v Situations, p. 98.) A 
domestic law prohibiting exportation of arms to 
a foreign state or states when these states have not 
declared war is wholly national and may be re-
pealed or declared inoperative in whole or in part 
1 Post, p. 171. 
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at any time by the state which enacted the law .. 
Such a law does not confer upon any foreig11 state 
a right to treat the articles named in the prohibi-
tion as contraband of war, or to treat the vessels 
transporting the articles as gt1ilty of the carriage 
of contraband. Indeed as a domestic measure a 
state in the time of peace or even when relations 
are strained between foreign states may, in absence 
of treaty agreement, prohibit under penalty of 
domestic law the exportation of certain articles, ex-
tend the list, or abolish the restrictions altogether 
from time to time as it may see fit. In time of law-
ful war the list of articles liable to penalty may be 
determined by the belligerent and the belligerent 
may under international law capture the goods and 
apply the penalty. The government of the United 
States has often in time of unsettled conditions 
changed its policy in regard to the export of certain 
articles. Domestic laws which may have an effect 
even upon international agreements relating to 
shipment of arms may be enacted or repealed. 
This was evident in a communication of the Secre-
tary of State Hughes to the Charge in Japan, 
March 19, 1921: 
"A joint resolution of Congress approved March 3, 1921, 
repealing certain sections of the Espionage Act of June 15, 
1917, has deprived this Government of any legal basis under 
which it can control shipments of arms and munitions to 
China as provided for in the joint declaration made on May 
5, 1919 by the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, 
France, Italy, Spain, The Nether lands, Denn1ark, Belgium, 
Portugal, Brazil and Japan. This Government has not 
changed its policy in this regard however and is seeking 
from Congress legislation necessary to enable it to continue 
control over shipments of arms to China and in the mean-
time will refuse to support any efforts on the part of Ameri· 
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can citizens to ship or sell arms to China. You will bring 
the above to the attention of the Japanese Foreign Office for 
its confidential information and express this Government's 
hope that nothing will be done to change the present policy 
o:f the Powers in this matter." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 
1921, I, 552.) 
Further correspondence shows that so far as the 
United States \Vas concerned, the whole matter of 
prohibition of ship1nent of arms was regarded as 
subject to domestic legislation and that interna-
tional agreements in regard thereto would be cor-
respondingly limited by domestic regulations. 
The Government of the United States in 1920 
without ratifying the Arms Traffie Convention and 
Protocol, September 10, 1919, announced that it 
adopted the spirit of this Convention ''as a matter 
of policy, insofar as concerns government owned or 
controlled arms.'' (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1920, 
I, 207.) 
Hostilities ~vithout declaration.-A.n act of hos-
tility by an armed force of a state without some 
.form of previollS public notification was in early 
times regarded as an act of perfidy and previous 
notification in the days of Rome was usually a for-
mal ceremony. Without such ceremony t!J-e war 
1night not be considered a just war. It was argued 
that if the object of the war n1ight be obtained with-
out the use of force, it was honorable that the state 
against which hostilities \Vere to be ai1ned should 
have opportunity to afford satisfaction before force 
was used. The mediaeval conception of chivalry 
demanded this degree of fair deali11g in a just \var. 
Grotius in the early seventeenth centtlry regarded 
formal declaration as the rule if war was to be 
recognized internationally, though there might be 
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a demand for satisfaction with conditional declara-
tion. 
Prior declaration "\Vas less general from the late 
seventeenth centt1ry. Of about 150 wars during 
the tvvo centuries from 1700 to 1900 few, not more 
than one in ten, seem to have been formally de-
clared at all and some lil{e the Spanish-American 
war of 1898 were declared after hostilities had 
begun. 
As the relations of state to state and of individual 
to individual change when war begins, it is of great 
importance to fix the time of the commencement of 
war. In the early days this was not difficult but 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth century this 
became uncertain or impossible. 
The formula which at first seemed simple was 
set up to the effect that "war begins with the first 
act of hostilities." This I)hrase was, however, not 
easy to interpret and· sometimes was differently in-
terpreted by courts of the same country at different 
periods ; consequently controversies arose upon the 
issue of the date of the beginning of the war. 
Prior declaration.-In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, a se11timent had been 
growing in favor of requiring a declaration prior 
to the opening of war. The Institute of Interna-
tional Law at the sessio11 at Ghe11t in 1906 favored 
such a regulation. 
It was pointed out that diplo1natic negotiations 
settled most differences bet\veen states and that a 
requirement of a declaration before resorting to 
hostilities would often prevent hostilities, and if a 
reasoned declaration was required this would be a 
further deterrent, for states might be reluctant to 
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make public their motives for gon1g to war. It was 
argued that a state should not go to war without a11 
ample motive .as \Var disturbed many established 
relations in the world. Third states should be noti-
fied as these states were put under new obligations 
and these should not be imposed without due notice 
and good reason. Of course, it was fully under-
stood that the published reason might not always 
be the true reason, but the honor of the state was 
involved or, as the French delegate at the Second 
Hague Conference, 1907, said, ''the spirit of loyalty 
which nations owe to each other in their mutual re-
lations, as well as the common interests of all 
states,'' should require previous and unequivocal 
notice. Any delay would afford more time for 
pacific settlement. 
Declaratio,n of 1.var.-As was shown at the 
Hague Peace Conference in 1907, there were ma11y 
reasons for a declaration of \Var before con1mence-
me~t of hostilities. Many conventions and treaties 
since 1907 have rested on the presumption that 
declaration prior to hostilities will be made. For 
neutral states this is essential in order that they 
may by proclamation regulate the conduct of their 
nationals and determine the rights and obligations 
governing the state under the changed conditions. 
The use of the neutral ports as places of sojollrn of 
vessels of war of the belligerents and in other re-
spects must be regulated, the amount and char-
acter of supplies or of repairs is to be determined 
and an entirely new legal status is in existence 
from the commencen1ent of the war. Merchant 
vessels of neutrals outside of neutral jurisdiction 
are under obligation to submit to visit and search, 
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may be taken to a prize court and their cargo may 
be condemned in whole or in part or the vessel 
itself may be condemned. The movement of neu-
tral vessels or persons may be restricted or for-
bidden in certain areas. Even bet,veen the bel-
ligerents the rights of persons and property as-
sume ne\V aspects. It is conceivable that these 
facts, together \vith a required prior declaration, 
may be a deterrent at times sufficient to prevent 
hostilities or reckless \Varlike undertakings. 
Hague Co1Lve1~tion on declaration of war.-The 
discussion in 1907 upon the need for declaration 
prior to hostilities between states showed that it 
was realized that in cases of civil war such a decla-
ration would not always · be expected though it 
might in some conditions clarify relations. 
Hague Convention III relative to the Opening 
of Hostilities states: 
"The Contracting Powers considering that it is important, 
in order to ensure the maintenance of pacific relations, that 
hostilities should not co1n1nence without previous warning; 
"That it is equally i1nportant that the existence of a state 
of ''ar should be notified ":ithout delay to neutral 
Powers· * * * 
' 
"ARTICLE 1. The Contracting Powers recognize that hos-
tilities between themselves must not commence without pre-
vious and explicit "Tarning, in the form either of a reasoned 
declaration of w·ar or of an ultimatum lrith conditional 
declaration of "Tar. 
" 1\.RTICLE 2. The existence of a state of "ar 1nust be 
notified to the neutral Po"Ters ''ithout delay, and shall not 
take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a 
notification, w·hich may, ho"Tever, be given by telegraph. 
Neutral Powers, nevertheless, ca1mot rely on the abs~nce of 
notification if it is clearly established that they ''ere in fact 
a'vare of the existence of a state of ''ar." (36 Stat. 2259.) 
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In explaining Article 1, the report of the Com-
mission entrusted with the topic said: 
"Two distinct cases are provided for. '\Then a dispute 
occurs between two States, it will ordinarily lead to diplo-
matic negotiations more or less lengthy, in 'vhich each 
party attempts to ha v~ its pretentions recognized, or at least 
to secure partial satisfaction. I£ an agreement is not 
reached, one o£ the Powers may set forth in an ultimatum 
the conditions which it requires and from 'vhich it declares 
it 'vill not recede. At the same time it fixes an interval 
within "\vhich a reply may be made and declares that, in the 
absence o£ satisfactory answer, it will have recourse to 
armed force. In this case there is no surprise and no 
equivocation. The Po·wer to which such an ultimatum is 
addressed can come to a decision 'vith a full know ledge of 
the circumstances; it n1ay give satisfaction to its adversary 
or it may fight. 
"Again, a dispute may arise suddenly, and a Po,,er may 
desire to have recourse to arms without entering upon or 
prolonging diplomatic negotiations that it considers useless. 
It ought in that case to give a direct 'varning o£ its intention 
to its adversary, and this warning ought to be explicit. 
"Wh;en an intention to have recourse to armed force is 
stated conditionally in an ultimatum, a reason is expressed, 
since war is to be the consequence o£ a refusal to give the 
satisfaction demanded. 'This is, however, not necessarily 
the case when the intention to make war is made manifest 
directly and without a previous ultin1atum. The proposal 
set out above requires that reasons be assigned in this case 
also. A Government ought not to e1nploy so extreme a 
measure as a resort to ar1ns without giving reasons. Every 
one, both in the countries about to become belligerents, and 
also in neutral countries, should know what the war is 
about in order to form a judgment on the conduct o£ the 
two adversaries. 0£ course this does not 1nean that we are 
to cherish the illusion that the real reasons for a 'var will 
always be giYen; but the difficulty o£ definitely stating rea-
sons, and the necessity o£ advancing reasons not 'vell sub-
stantiated or out of proportion to the gravity o£ 'var itself, 
will naturally arrest the attention o£ neutral Po"~ers and 
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enlighten public opinion." (Proceedings o:f the Hague 
Peace Conferences, Translation, Carnegie Endo,vment of 
International Peace, I, 132.) 
This report of the Commission shows tl1at the 
Conference was not so naive as to thinl{ that the 
reasons stated for declaring \var would al\vays cover 
all the reasons but that the obligation to give a rea-
son might be to some degree a deterrent. 
Further, it may be said that a very effective and 
automatic sanction ~aking declaration essential 
was the requirement that declaration be published 
to third states before these states were under the 
obligation of neutrals. There could be no co11tra-
band, blockade, unneutral service, etc., till the dec-
laration \Vas made kno\vn. Third states \Vould be 
under no obligation to limit the use of their ports 
for sojourn, the taking on of supplies, repairs, etc., 
or even the sale of vessels of \var might la\vfully be 
made prior to declaration of war. 
E1·nbargo Act, 1807.-The conditions which led 
to the Embargo Act of December 21, 1807, may not 
recur even though Jefferson hoped it might furnish 
a valuable leSSOll for the future. rrhis \VOUld be 
upon the presumption that conditions at the time 
of a subsequent struggle might closely resemble 
those at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Almost immediately the exports from the United 
States fell to a point where that trade was only 
about one-fifth that of the previous year and condi-
tions in regard to illicit trade in many articles re-
sembled those of the recent prohibition era in the 
United States. National politics were embittered, 
leaders previously popular were repudiated, and 
sectional differences were aggravated. The atti-
tude of citizens of the United States toward the 
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belligere11ts becan1e hostile and demands for pro-
tection of America11 rights "rere frequently made. 
The embargo 'vas repealed in May 20, 1809, leaving 
a spirit easily fanned i11to belligerency a few years 
later. Since this period of the early nineteenth 
century, there has been much difference of opinion 
upo11 the question as to whether relinquishing or 
defending neutral rights may be the course more 
likely to lead a powerful state into a war. 
British hovering, 1916.-Even in time of war 
the authorities of the United States have regarded 
the sojourn of belligerent vessels of war just out-
side territorial waters as inconsistent with conduct 
of a friendly power and as causing unnecessary in-
terference with American commerce. 
During the World War, early in October 1914, 
the Department of State called the attention of the 
British Ambassador to the fact that the nearness 
of British vessels of war to the entrance to the 
port of New York 'vas causing ''a very bad im-
pression'' : 
"1Vhile, of course, the presence of these vessels does not 
constitute anything in the nature of a blockade by Great 
Britain, the effect is to interfere so with our commerce with 
her enemies as to infringe upon our commercial rights in 
appearance if not in fact. 
"I am writing you personally in regard to this matter, 
as I have already told you informally that the presence of 
the Suffolk had caused considerable concern and that its 
continuance might be construed into an unfriendly act, re-
quiring official action. This latter possibility I hope can 
be avoided." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1914, Supp., 
p. 657.) · 
Other incidents followed and further protests 
were n1ade by the United States, a~d a l~tter of 
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~larch 20, 1916, from the British Ambassador to 
the Secretary of State said: 
"~Iy Government has carefully studied the contents of 
your notes. They are impressed by the fact that no sugges-
tion seems to be made in either of them that British cruisers 
enter at all within the territorial "\Yaters of the United 
States, and they note that, on the contrary, the effect of the 
notes is to take exception to proceedings of these vessels 
'vhen navigating admittedly on the high seas. The objec-
tion appears, indeed, to rest upon a claim to distinguish be-
t,veen different parts of the high seas, a claim which causes 
surprise to His ~fajesty's Goverl1Ill:ent, who are una,vare 
of the existence of any rules or principles of international 
law which render belligerent operations which are legitimate 
in one part of the high seas, illegitimate in another. Under 
these circumstances it appears desirable that the position 
taken up by the United States Government should be more 
clearly defined. I am therefore instructed to have recourse 
to your courtesy in order to obtain fuller information as to 
the precise nature and grounds of the claims which are n1ade 
by your Goverrunent, as well as their extent, since my Gov-
ernment are most anxious to recognise in the full any claims 
of this nature which are well founded in law, but are 
naturally unable to make a concession o:f what they regard 
as their belligerent rights. 
"The rights asserted in this respect by the United States 
Govern1nent in previous wars will no doubt be conceded by 
the United States Government as well founded when exer-
cised by others. It will be in your recollection that my 
predecessor, Lord Lyons, complained that Rear Admiral 
Wilkes had ordered the vessels under his corrunand to an-
chor in such a position as to control the moven1ents of ships 
desiring to enter or to depart from the port of Bermuda, 
and that he maintained a system of cruising in the neutral 
"\Vaters of Bermuda in excess of his rights as a belligerent. 
The charge "\vas thus of a far more serious nature than that 
"\vhich the United States Government now make against His 
Majesty's ships. · Admiral "'\Vilkes in his reply, which was 
communicated officially by ~ir. Secretary of State Seward 
to His Majesty's Legation on January 15, 1863, asserted that 
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his vessels 'but maintained a system of cruising outside of 
the neutral waters of Bermuda in and under our rights as a 
belligerent.' It is clear, therefore, that this officer of the 
United States Navy, 'vhose vie'v was evidently endorsed by 
the United States Government, considered that his proceed-
ings 'vere fully justified so long as he could maintain that 
they had been restricted to the very practice of which the 
United States Government now complain, though resorted 
to in a far less aggravated form by His ~Iajesty's ships, and 
of which they appear actually to desire to impung the 
legality." (Ibid., 1916, Supp., p. 759.) 
On April 26, 1916, the Secretary of State in a 
long nole stated: 
"In reply it may he stated that the Government of the 
United States advances no claim th~t British vessels 'vhich 
have been and are cruising off Alnerican ports beyond the 
three-mile limit have not in so doing been within their 
strict legal rights under international law. The grounds 
for the objection of the Government of the United States 
to the continued presence of belligerent vessels of war cruis-
ing in close proximity to American ports are based, not upon 
thf' illegality of such action, but upon the irritation which it 
naturally causes to a neutral country." * * * 
"In time of peace the mobilization of an army, partic-
ularly if near the frontier, has often been regarded as a 
ground for serious offense and been made the subject of 
protest by the Government of a neighboring country. In 
the present war it has even been the ground for a declara-
tion of 'var and the beginning of hostilities. Upon the 
same principle the constant and menacing presence of 
cruisers on the high seas near the ports of a neutral country 
may be regarded according to the canons of international 
courtesy as a just ground for offense, although it may be 
strictly legal." (Ibid., p. 763.) 
The British authorities took the position that 
they could not abandon any of their belligerent 
rights, but instructions had been given "not to 
approach Ambrose Light nearer than six miles.'' 
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Protests 'vere also made to Germany, France, 
and J apa11 i11 regard to the conduct of vessels of 
war of these states just off or within territorial 
waters. 
Restrictio1~ 01~ exports.-Restriction on exports 
fro1n one state to another ·has often been resorted 
to in order to bring pressure upon the importing 
state. Tl1e reason for the pressure may vary and 
being most often domestic in character are usually 
political. 
A Joint Resolution of Congress of the United 
States, approved March 14, 1912, provided: 
"That the joint resolution to prohibit the export of coal or 
other material used in war from any seaport of the United 
States, approved April twenty-second, eighteen hundred and 
ninety-eight, be, and hereby is, a1nended to read as follows: 
" 'That whenever the President shall find that in any 
American country conditions of domestic violence exist 
which are protnoted by the use of arn1s or munitions of war 
procured from the United States, and shall make proclama-
tion thereof, it shall be unla,vful to export except under such 
limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe 
any arms or munitions of "~ar from any place in the 
United States to such country until otherwise ordered by the 
President or Congress. 
"'SEc. 2. That any shipment of 1naterial hereby declared 
unla ,vful after such a proclamation shall be punishable by 
fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, or imprisonment not 
exceeding two years, or both.' " ( 37 Stat. 630.) 
By presidential proclamation this resolution was 
made immediately applicable to Mexico when a 
condito11 of ''domestic violence'' prevailed. 
I11 1914 after the outbreak of the World War 
and while the United States was neutral, a Circu-
lar of the Department of State, October 15, 1914, 
DOl\1ESTIC VIOLENCE AKD CO:\ll\IERCE 57 
referring to trade in contraband and sales to 
belligerents, said : 
·'Furtherinore, a neutral govern1nent is not coin pelled by 
international la,v, by treaty, or by statute to prevent these 
sales to a belligerent. Such sales, therefore, by A1nerican 
citizens do not in the least affect the neutrality of the United 
States. 
"It is true that such articles as those mentioned are con-
sidered contraband and are, outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of a neutral nation, subject to seizure by an enmny of 
the pur·chasing govern1nent, but it is the enemy's duty to pre-
vent the articles reaching their destination, not the duty 
of the nation ""'hose citizens have sold them. If the enemy of 
the purchasing nation happens for the time to be unable to 
do this that is for him one of the misfortunes of war; the 
inability, how·ever, iinposes on the neutral govern1nent no 
obligation to prevent the sale. 
"Neither the President nor any executive department of 
the Government possesses the legal authority to interfere in 
any way with trade bet,veen the people of this country and 
the territory of the belligerent. There is no act of Con-
gress conferring such authority or prohibiting traffic of this 
sort \vith European nations, although in the case of neigh-
boring American Republics Congress has given the President 
power to proclaim an embargo on arms and a1nmunition 
when in his judgment it \Vould tend to prevent civil strife." 
(Foreign Relations, U.S. 1914, Sup., p. 574.) 
Many restrictions were from time to time im-
posed upon exportation from the United States of 
mtlnitions and the like under the act of J u11e 15, 
1911, 'vhich had entrusted to the Preside11t this 
power. 
The restrictions placed on exportation and im-
portation during the World War 'vere not always 
for military reasons or on the grou11d of neutral 
obligations, but the disturba11ce of eco11omic rela-
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tio11s son1etimes made 11ecessary the conservation 
of national resources by special regulations. 
Att~·tude of the U1~ited States i?~ 1921.-In reply 
to a request from the Oriental Trading Company 
desiring to ship rifles and ammunition to China, 
transn1itted through the Gover11or General of the. 
Philippi11e Islands, the Department of State in-
formed the Secretary of War of its attitude on 
September 12, 1921, as follo,vs: 
"There has been an understanding since l\fay, 1919, among 
the po"~ers ''ho were allied and associated in the war, 
whereby they undertook to restrict shipn1ents by their na-
tionals to China of arms and n1unitions of ''ar as long as it 
was obvious that the importation of such military equip-
Inent into China tended only to prolong the present unfor-
tunate state of civil strife in that country. This Government 
was enabled to fulfill its part of that obligation by reason of 
those provisions of the Espionage Act which gave the Execu-
tiYe control oYer exports, through the intermediary of the 
'V ar Trade Board. 
"Certain provisions of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, 
were repealed by a Joint Resolution of Congress, which was 
approved ~1arch 3, 1921. An1ong those provisions thus re-
pealed ·were those which provided for control over exports, 
and the Executive has therefore been deprived of any legal 
basis upon which to exercise further control over shipments 
o£ ar1ns to China. There would appear to be no reason 
for believing that conditions in China at the present time 
warrant any change in the policy of this Government in this 
matter, and the Department of State is therefore seeking 
to obtain legislation to enable it to continue to cooperate 
with the po,vers who are parties to the joint declaration of 
~fay 5, 1919. It is expected that the matter will be brought 
up 'vhen Congress convenes the latter part of the present 
month. In the meantime, the Department of State, as ~ 
matter of policy, is refusing to lend any encouragement or 
support to American n1anufacturers of munitions who desire 
to sell or ship arms and munitions of war to China.~' 
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1921, I, 560.) 
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Restrictions 01~ carriage of mu1~itio1~s to Spain.-
During the ''civil strife'' in Spain there were nu-
merous attempts to restrict commerce both by na-
tion'al legislation and international agreement. 
The British Merchant Shipping .Act (Carriage 
of Munitions to Spain), 1936 (1 Edw. 8, c. 1), ap-
plying in general to all ships under British registry 
(except from dominions and dependencies) carry-
i11g munitions etc., provided: 
"I. 1. No article to 'vhich this Act applies shall be dis-
charged at any port or place in Spanish territory or within 
the territorial 'vaters adjacent thereto from a ship to which 
this Act applies, and no such article shall be transhipped on 
the high seas from any such ship into any vessel bound for 
any such port or place, and no such article consigned to or 
destined for any such port or place shall be taken on board 
or carried in any such ship." (31 A. J. I. L. [1937], Doc. 
Supp., p. 100.) 
It was also provided as to an officer empowered to 
e11force tl1is .Act, that-
" (a) he m~y go on board the ship and for that purpose 
n1ay detain the ship or require it to stop or to proceed to 
some convenient place; 
(b) he may require the 1naster to produce any docun1ents 
relating to any cargo ·w·hich is being carried or has been car-
ried on the ship; 
(c) he may search the ship and examine the cargo and re-
quire the master or any member of the crew to open any 
package or parcel which he suspects to contain any articles 
to which this Act applies; 
"(d) he may make any other examination or inquiry 
which he deems necessary to ascertain ·whether this Act is 
being or has been contravened; 
" (e) if it appears to him that this Act is being or has 
been contravened, he may, without summons, warrant, or 
other process, take the ship and her cargo and her master and 
crew to the nearest or most convenient port in a country to 
which this Act extends, in order that the alleged contraven-
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tion 1nay be adjudicated upon by a con1petent court.' (Ibid., 
p. 101.) 
The U11ited States by joint resolution, January 
8, 1937, prohibited the export of arms, ammunition, 
or implements of 'var to Spain under penalty of 
fu1e or ilnprisonme11t (50 Stat., pt. I, p. 3). There 
were many other regulations referring to the Span-
ish conflict giving a degree of supervision to foreign 
states in order that the area of the conflict might be 
limited. 
Attitude of U1tited States Navy.-The Navy of 
the United States through its wide contacts has 
been confronted with many situations "\vhere 
strained relations prevailed. These strained rela-
tions might have been bet,veen the United States 
and a foreign state or between tvvo foreign states 
in a manner involving the United States. As a 
guide for officers of the Navy of the United States, 
the Regulations prescribe: 
"722. On occasions where injury to the United States or to 
citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of 
the principles of international law or treaty rights, the com-
Inander in chief shall consult with the diplomatic represen-
tative or consul of the United States, and take such steps 
as the gravity of the case den1ands, reporting immediately 
to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsi-
bility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests 
'Yholly upon the commanding officer thereof. 
"723. The use of :force against a foreign and :friendly 
state, or against anyone within the territories thereof, is 
illegal. 
"The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which 
belongs to States as "~en as to individuals, and in the case of 
States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and 
its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens 
against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the 
State or its citizens 1nay suffer irreparable injury. The con-
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ditions calling for the application of the right of self-preser-
vation can not be defined beforehand, but must be left to the 
sound judgment of. responsible officers, who are to perform 
their duties in this respect 'vith all possible care and for-
bearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace 
otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preser-
vation as above defined. It must be used only as a last re-
sort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely neces-
sary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exer-
cised with a vie'v to inflicting punishment for acts already 
con1mitted. 
"(1) vVhenever, in the application of the above-mentioned 
principles, it shall become necessary to land an armed force 
in foreign territory on occasions of political disturbance 
where the local authorities are unable to give adequate pro-
tection to life and property, the assent of such authorities, or 
of some one of them, shall first be obtained, if it can be done 
without prejudice to the interests involved. 
"(2) Due to the ease w·ith which the Navy Department 
can be communicated "\vith from all parts of the "\Vorld, no 
commander in chief, flag officer, or commanding officer shall 
issue an ultimatum to the representatives of any foreign 
Governinent, .or demand the performance of any service from 
any such representative that must be executed within a lim-
ited time, without first communicating "\vith the Navy De-
partment, except in extre1ne cases where such action is 
necessary to save life." 
American policy, 1937.-A.fter referring to the 
disturbed international relations prevailing in 
1937 and to the fact that serious hostilities any-
where were a deep concern of the whole world, Sec-
retary of State Hull said on July 6: 
"This country constantly and consistently advocates main-
tenance of peace. We advocate national and international 
self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from 
use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the 
internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment 
of problems in international relations by processes of peace-
ful negotiation and agreement. 'Ve advocate faithful ob-
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servance of international agreements. Upholding the prin-
ci pie of the sanctity of treaties, 've believe in modification of 
provisions of treaties, w·hen need therefor arises, by orderly 
processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and 
accomn1odation. \V e believe in respect by all nations for the 
rights of others and perfor1nance by all nations of estab-
lished obligations. \·Ve stand for revitalizing and strength-
ening of international law. vVe advocate steps toward pro-
motion of economic security and stability the world over. 
vVe advocate Io,vering or removing of excessive barriers in 
international trade. ''T e seek effective equality of commer-
cial opportunity and 've urge upon all nations application 
of the principle o:f equality of treatment. \Ve believe in 
limitation and reduction o:f arma1nent. Realizing the neces-
sity :for maintaining armed :forces adequate :for national se-
curity, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own 
armed :forces in proportion to reductions or increases made 
by other countries. "'\Ve avoid entering into alliances or en-
tangling comn1itn1ents but we believe in .cooperative effort by 
peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles 
hereinbefore stated." (Department of State, Press Releases, 
XVII, No. 407, July 17, 1937, p. 41.) 
This statement of policy was circulated to other 
governments in the hope that if they "should ap-
prove the principles of the declaration as the under-
lying bases for international relations, the cumu-
lative effect of their approval 'vould do much to 
revitalize and to strengthen standards desirable in 
international condu~t." (Ibid., p. 87.) 
There was a general approval as shown 1n re-
plies from states on the different continents. 
"Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
"The Ministry :for Foreign Affairs was officially informed 
concerning the declaration of the principles which orientate 
the :foreign policy of the United States made on the 16th of 
July by the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull. The state-
ment of the Secretary of State having been brought to the 
attention of the President of the Republic by the Minister :for 
FOREIGN ATTITUDE OX A:\lERICAN POLICY, 1937 63 
Foreign Affairs, the latter received instructions from the 
President to make public that the Brazilian Government, en-
tirely sharing the point of view o£ the Government of the 
United States concerning the world international political 
situation, fully a·grees with those declarations and gives com-
plete support to the principles formulated therein, which 
have already been warmly advocated in the inter-American 
Conference for the maintenance of peace and at other in-
ternational political assemblies and which it will do every-
thing possible to put into practice by the most convenient 
methods at every opportunity which arises." (Ibid., p. 89.) 
"LVote from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
American Ambassador to F1·ance. 
"Today, more than ever before, the need is exident for 
soljdarity between all the nations of the world and vigilant 
attention to every situation which ·might lead to a resort to 
force. In counseling moderation in the realm of interna-
tional affairs and national affairs; in advising nations not 
to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations; in recom-
mending the settlement of differences by negotiations and 
peaceful agreements; in insisting that international obliga-
tions should be faithfully observed and carried out in a 
spirit of justice, mutual helpfulness, and reconciliation, Mr. 
Cordell Hull has stressed those wholesome methods which 
should assure the maintenance o£ peace.'' (Ibid., p. 94.) 
"M ~ssage From the British Llfinister for Foreign Affairs 
to the America~ Ambassador to Great Britain. 
"I have read with deep interest ~fr. Hull's statement on 
:foreign policy of the 16th o£ July, the text of which was 
communicated to me by the United States Ambassador. I 
cordially welcome and am in full agreement with the ex-
pression of opinion contained therein on international prob-
lems and situations both in the political and economical 
field. Mr. Hull's views on the ever increasing need for the 
preservation of peace, the vital importance o£ international 
cooperation in every sphere, and the methods which are 
recommended for obtaining these objectives are shared in 
common by His Majesty's Government in the United King-
dom." (Ibid., p. 95.) 
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"State1ne·at by the Japanese Govern1nent Handed to th~ 
Secretary of State by the Japanese Arnbassador. 
"'I'he J apancse Governn1ent "~ishes to express its concur-
rence ''ith the principles contained in the state1nent made 
by Secretary of State Hull on the 16th instant concerning 
the 1naintenance of 'vorld peace. It is the belief of the 
Japanese Government that the objectives of those principles 
"·ill only be attained, in their application to the Far Eastern 
situation, by a :full recognition and practical consideration 
of the actual particular circtunstances of that region." 
(Ibid., p. 130.) 
"State1nent by the South African Prhne JJJinister and 
jJJinister of Ewternal Affairs of the Am-erican Charge in 
the Union of South Africa. 
_"The staten1ent of :foreign policy by nir. Cordell Hull in 
every respect conforms 'vitl~ the vie,vs held and policy 
adopted :from time to ti1ne by the Government of the 
Union, :for the purpose of defining its o"·n attitude to,vards 
other states and indicates the principles of conduct 'vhich 
it expects to be observed by the1n in their dealings with the 
Union. 
"I, therefore, heartily approve the statem~nt of policy by 
the Secretary of State, so :far an the Union is concerned 
under present circumstances. 
"I say: under present circumstances, for I cannot help 
:feeling that if the Union had been in the position of a state 
labor.ing under ''rongs confirmed or perpetuated by agree-
ment at the point of the bayonet, such agree1nent could have 
little claim to any degree of sanctity; and certainly to none 
when the agreen1ent had been obtained in a manner violating 
the established usage of 'var, or contrary to the dictates of 
international consciences. Before such an agreement can 
be accepted as enjoying the principle of the sanctity of 
treaties there should, it seen1s to me, first be an equitable 
1neasure of redress purifying it of the excesses resulting 
there:fro1n. In other 'vords, a revision of the provisions of 
such an agreement could 'veil be insisted upon by the state 
"·ronged prior to its approYal of the principle of the sanctity 
of treaties. 
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"If this v]e,v is correct, ~1r. Hull's advocacy of faithful 
observance of international agreements 'vould not require 
qualification of a restrictive nature." (Ibid., p. 103.) 
The replies fron1 many governments were in the 
form of some,vhat general comments upon the 
principles underlying the 11ote of Mr. Hllll, though 
occasionally there vvas an intimatio11 that "\Vhile the 
principles were praise,vorthy what was particu-
larly needed was the will among states to make 
the 1)rinciples practically applicable. A consider-
able nllmber of states implied that a lo11g step to-
V\7ard the application of the princi1Jles might be 
fou11d in some system of collective security. 
Innocent passage.-In the. Draft Convention. on 
Territorial Waters, Research in International La,v, 
Harvard Lavv School, Article 14, the follovvi11g was 
proposed: 
"A state must permit innocent passage through its mar-
ginal seas by the vessels of other states, but it may prescribe 
reasonable regulations for such passage." (23 A. J. I. L., 
Spec. Sup., [1929], p. 295.) 
In the com1nent on this article, it "\Vas said: 
"Even for vessels entitled to exercise the right of innocent 
passage it is obviously necessary that each state should be 
permitted to make reasonable regulations governing that 
passage, subject only to the restriction that· th.ese regula-
tions be uniform for all states. Such regulations may, of 
course, distinguish between different kinds of vessels. For 
example, a littoral state might require all subn1arine vessels 
of other states to navigate upon the surface in order that 
shipping in the marginal sea 1nay not be subjected to 
unknown risks." (Ibid.) 
The question of innocent passage arose in many 
forms in consequence of attempts of the United 
States to enforce the liquor prohibition amend-
ment to the Constitution (.Article 18), 1919, re-
pealed 1933. In the British Parliament such ques-
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tio11s as the follo,ving "\vere raised "\vith the Prime 
1\'Iinister : 
"In Yie'Y of the prohibition la,vs of the United States and 
their effect on British shipping and the near approach of 
lOth June, he can no'v state ''hat is the policy of His 
nfajesty's Govern1nent on this question; and "~hether they 
'viii still adhere to the long accepted international practice 
under ''hich the }a,,s of its o·wn flag goYern and regulate 
the rights, duties and obligations on board a ship, 'vhether 
on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of any other 
nation~" (Parlian1entary Debates, Com1nons, 5th Series, 
CVX\TII (1923), 1972.) 
To this question the Prime Minister replied : 
"His l\Iajesty's Governn1ent do not contend that a ship 
entering the territorial ''aters_ of a country does not subject 
itself to the jurisdiction of that country, but, as a matter of 
international comity, such jurisdiction is not generally 
exercised except to restrain acts likely to disturb public 
order. No possible disturbance to public order in the 
United States nor injury to any other United States interest 
can arise from the existence of liquor under seal on board a 
ship in United States territorial waters. His ~1ajesty's 
Government accordingly suggested to the United States 
Governtnent that the proposed Regulation is one 'vhich 
n1ight properly be discussed 'vith the other 1naritime Powers 
before it is enforced, but I understand that the United 
States Government do not see their way to con1ply 'vith this 
request." (Ibid.) 
.After negotiatio11 a treaty "\vith Great Britail\ 
contaiiliilg the follo,ving Article "\vas adopted 
and ratified on May 22, 1924: 
"ARTICLE I. The High Contracting Parties declare that 
it is their firm intention to uphold the principle that 3 
1narine 1niles extending fron1 the coastline outwards and 
1neasured fron1 lo,v-,vater n1ark constitute the proper limits 
of territorial ''aters." ( 43 Stat., Pt. 2, p. 1761.) 
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Similar treaties were negotiated with other states 
and the right of innocent passage was generally 
accepted. 
Gene1'"al conclusio1~s.-N either state X nor state 
Y has declared war. These states have no right 
to claim to be acting as belligerents nor to treat 
other states as neutrals. There \Vould, therefore, 
be no right to visit and search as a measure of war. 
No contraband list could be declared, no blockade 
could be established, nor could there be unneutral 
service. 
A state may at any time establish an embargo 
and name in the list of embargoed goods such arti-
cles as it sees fit. There is always the possibility 
that some state or states may consider such an en-
bargo as an unfriendly act, \vhetheT it restricts the 
movement of domestic or foreign goods. An em-
bargo is purely domestic and implies no right to 
exercise authority outside the limits of the juris-
diction of a state. The e11forcement of an embargo 
act is, in absence of specific treaty engagements, a 
matter for the state establishing the embargo. 
Alliances between states are for the objects men-
tioned and are usually strictly interpreted. A. de-
fensive alliance \Vould be effective \Vhen one of the 
states parties to the alliance is attacked. The em-
bargo confers no authority over ships of third 
states on the high sea. The right to enforce an 
embargo within the jurisdiction gives no right 
to deny the right of innocent passage, though, of 
course, measures may be taken to prevent abuse of 
the right. This does not confer the right of visit, 
search, seizure, and condemnation. 
A. state has a right to go to war. The existence 
of war changes the relations of all states. Other 
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states have a right to kno'v when the change takes 
place, as they must adapt their conduct to the 
changed relationship. War has always and natu-
rally aimed to obtain all possible advantages, and 
11eutrality has limited belligerent action; hence 
there has bee11 a conflict of interest between the 
belligerents and the neutrals. 
SOLUTION 
(a) As there is 110 'var a11d as the law mentioned 
relati11g to the export of arms, etc., is national in 
its effect, the action of state X has no validity 
under that la\v even though states 0 and D have 
proclaimed that a state of. war exists. 
(b) A vessel of vvar of state Y has the right to 
approach a merchant vessel suspected of piracy or 
other offense against the law of nations for pur-
pose of identification, but the vessel of war of state 
X has no right to inspect or to take any action in 
regard to the articles in the cargo of a 1nerchant 
vessel of state D and embargoed under domestic 
la\v. 
(c) The allia11ce bet\veen states E, F, and X 
would bind state E only for defense and not before 
state X or F is at war with a third state. 
(d) The embargo legislation is purely domestic 
and a vessel of war of state 0 may not lawfully in-
terfere with a merchant vessel of state M when on 
innocent passage through the territorial waters of 
state C. 
